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LEGAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE CANADA/U.S.
CONTEXT: A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT HIRING, TERMINATION,
AND REGULATION OF THE WORKPLACE: A CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVE

Roy L. Heenan*
As SOME OF YOU MAY KNOW, I was born in Mexico. I cannot help
looking around a room like this and remembering the famous Mexican
gypsy curse. The worst thing a Mexican gypsy can wish on you is:
"Que entre abogados te encuentres," that is, "May you be found between lawyers." Indeed, this is the worst thing that could be wished on
anybody. I often find myself in this company and sympathize with arbitrators for exactly the same reason.
I thank you for inviting me back to this conference. I was here in
1990 and the only reason I can think of that might explain why you
invited me back is, again, a Mexican saying: "El diablo es mas sabio
por viejo que por diablo." In English, "The devil is wiser because he's
old rather than because he's a devil." My age must have something to
do with my repeat visit.
I was very interested in the topic and the framework of the conference itself: the impact of NAFTA and a comparative look at hiring,
termination, and regulation of the workplace. Since I gave a speech on
exactly the same topic in 1990, I was tempted either to refer you to it,
in which case I would never be asked back again, or else, even more
rudely, just to give you the same speech and see if anybody would notice. I decided not to adopt either of those approaches. Rather than go
into the nuts and bolts of the relevant issues, as I did in 1990, I am
going to do two things.
First, I want to talk conceptually of the impact of NAFTA, how it
is affecting human resources and how the unions, in particular, have
reacted. Then I will turn to a comparative look at the different directions we have taken in our respective countries.
Let me talk first about the impact of NAFTA. You will remember
the two concerns that were voiced, particularly by the trade unions, at
the time NAFTA was passed. The first concern was that jobs would be
exported to Mexico because of low wages. It was Mr. Perot, perhaps,
who did the best job of describing it as a "giant sucking sound" of jobs
moving down to Mexico.
The reason this first concern is of particular interest to me is be* Roy Heenan is Senior Partner at Heenan Blailde in Montreal, Canada.
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cause, as you may know, a company called Kenworth, in and around
Montreal, has very recently announced a plant closure and the termination of some eight hundred jobs. Of course, the trade union movement has cried "you see, this is the result of NAFTA!" I shall return to
this specific example later on because I believe it is a very interesting
case study.
The second concern was one raised by academics - some of you
may be authors of this view so you will excuse me if I do not always
agree with the academic literature - that is, the theory of "the race to
the bottom." Put briefly, the theory suggests that labour standards and
wages will plummet in order to protect jobs. As a result, we will find
ourselves in a chaotic situation as competing countries begin racing
against one another to do away with their regulations, labour protection, and health standards.
These were the two concerns that, as you know, led to the passage
of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).
The NAALC attempted to deal with these growing misgivings, particularly, when it became apparent that Mexico, despite having signed
many more treaties and ILO conventions than either your country or
mine, was not enforcing its own laws.
I have four answers to the arguments about low wages, the giant
sucking sound, and the race to the bottom arguments. The first I quote
from the famous philosopher, Casey Stengel, who stated that "predictions are hard to make, especially about the future." He also referred
to d6jA vu all over again, and, in my view, this is exactly what I am
hearing.
At the time that Canada and the United States entered the Free
Trade Agreement, the Canadian Automobile Workers made the following prediction: "Workers in the Southern United States industries
working under terrible working conditions, low standards of health and
safety, and substandard wages may well become the benchmark for
Canadian manufacturing." 1
This has not happened. NAFTA did not stop the election of two
socialist governments in Ontario and British Columbia, who passed
some of the most pro-employee labour legislation anywhere in the
Western World. Nor did it stop the people of Ontario from voting
against the Ontario government in repealing most of this legislation
when they found it to be ill-conceived. This certainly does not, however,
suggest that our countries have dismantled their labour security.
The second answer I put to you is that, in terms of low-wage cost
analysis, this argument is far too simplistic. If it were true that jobs
gravitated to low wages, then one would find that Greece and Portugal
had become the manufacturing motors of Europe. In terms of wages,
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TRADE COULD COST Us CANADA

8 (Willowdale: C.A.W.-Canada) (1986).
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both these countries stand in relationship to Germany as Mexico does
to Canada. Yet, I think it is evident from the European experience that
employment opportunities and jobs have not all gone to Greece and
Portugal. In world terms, Zaire and Bangladesh should be the manufacturing powerhouses of the world, yet, again, such is obviously not
the case.
The third answer relates to an interesting study conducted by Peat
Marwick in 1993. As part of this study, the thousand largest companies
in Canada were surveyed and asked to what extent low wages figured
in their decision-making process. The results indicated that low wages
were the ninth most important factor, slightly above climatic conditions, in order of importance.
Much more critical were the first eight factors: 1) level of taxation; 2) availability of skilled employees; 3) value of the Canadian dollar; 4) communication facilities; 5) transportation facilities; 6) market
proximity; 7) proximity of high-quality educational facilities; and, 8)
interest rates.
The results of this survey are highly significant in demonstrating
that other criteria are indeed more influential in the decision-making
process than merely the low-wage factor. The infrastructure of a country from which both the United States and Canada greatly benefit is, I
suggest, a far more important factor than is any wage differential.
The fourth reply to union concerns about NAFTA is the following:
In Canada, power over labour matters is shared between eleven jurisdictions. Our labour law falls mostly within the jurisdiction of the provinces - "states" in your terms. Exceptionally, labour matters fall
within Federal competence when dealing with important national employers such as banks, aviation, television and telephone companies,
and other large companies of that nature. It remains, however, that the
basic manufacturing industry is wholly subject to provincial legislation.
There has clearly not been uniformity of standards among the different
provinces in this area. Were the union's prediction correct, one would
expect jobs and employment opportunities to have migrated to the lowwage provinces. The poorest province, the one with the least labour regulation and the lowest minimum wages is Newfoundland. Yet, the
manufacturing industry in Canada has certainly not moved to
Newfoundland.
Moreover, as Professor Brian Langille of Toronto has pointed out,
important Canadian social policies, such as Medicare, represent, for us,
a significant competitive edge over the United States. A Medicare system removes insurance costs from the employer's cost of doing business
and, as a result, should be viewed, not as something to be dismantled,
but as something which gives us a positive advantage. Many such social
policies can likewise be justified in efficiency and equity terms. Professor Weiler, in his study of the country, came rapidly to the conclusion

CANADA-UNITED

STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:117 1996

that there has not been a race to the bottom.
Also, it should be noted that the minimum wage rate in Quebec
has recently risen to $6.45 an hour, and the minimum wage progression
continues on in our country. Yet once again, this expected rush to lowwage countries or race to the bottom has not proven true.
Hence, as regards the impact of NAFTA, let me suggest to you
that the fears that a race to the bottom would begin or that jobs would
disappear to Mexico have just not materialized. Having said this, it
certainly does not mean that we can simply ignore the effect of our
labour laws on our competitive position or the comparative advantages
of other countries.
One of the most significant differences between Canada and the
United States is, of course, our respective levels of unionization. In Canada, we are between thirty and forty percent unionized, whereas, the
United States is somewhere in the low teens. As a result of this significant difference, regulation in our country still finds its source, in large
part, from the collective bargaining process. Therefore, hiring, termination, and regulation decisions in a vast section of our economic endeavour are governed by collective agreements rather than individual
contract.
Moreover, Canada has been notoriously adversarial in its industrial relations. The Kenworth matter, which I mentioned earlier, is of
particular importance. I speak about it with a certain amount of passion because it is a matter which interests me. On April 9th, 1996, the
company announced, that it was going to close its plant resulting in the
loss of eight hundred jobs. It should be immediately pointed out that
this announcement came after an eight-month strike. The company had
not made a profit for the last four to five years and the union continued
to demand higher pensions. After eight months - and this was the
second eight-month strike in ten years - the company said "thanks,
but no thanks."
I suggest to you that this was not a race to the bottom. Rather,
this was a question of adversarial -

and what I call stupid -

indus-

trial relations causing people to reconsider a very simple investment
decision. Although the papers like to report that the plant is moving to
Mexico, this is not true. Kenworth recently built a plant in Seattle,
which is not a lower-wage area. It is, in fact, a higher-wage area.
I am not involved in the Kenworth dispute. I know only what I
read in the newspapers. I noticed that the Quebec Minister of Finance
responded very quickly saying that the NAFTA had nothing to do with
Kenworth's decision. Rather, the move was an example of another adversarial relationship gone awry.
In keeping with today's comparative theme, let me point out some
of the other significant differences between Canada and the United
States. Having listened to the very interesting presentations, I have
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noted two things that you have which we do not. First, we do not have
an employment-at-will doctrine. Basically, as the law stands in Canada,
an employer may only terminate a job for just cause. All of our labour
statutes provide for just cause, either expressly or impliedly, as an essential condition for termination of employment. Hence, most, if not
all, employers know that they must meet a just cause standard if they
wish to terminate employment in Canada.
Also, we did not succumb to the foolishness - and you will excuse
my use of those terms - of holding jury trials to decide employment
matters. I have heard my American colleagues rail about Title VII
cases like the fifty-four million dollar decisions against Wal-Mart and
other such jury awards. We have not adopted this approach, and I
think it is both interesting and important for you to know why this is
so. I am not suggesting that our system would work down here. What I
am suggesting is that we have taken a different route, which is probably, if I may say so, a better route to have followed.
I remember the time when we used to look to Sweden and everybody used to argue in favour of introducing the Swedish system in Canada. I think it was Chief Justice Gold who replied that the trouble
with implanting Swedish labour laws in Canada was that there were
not enough Swedes in Canada. Indeed, labour laws tend to reflect the
makeup of the country. It is not always wise to try to implant a foreign
system into your own. However, let me point out that Canadian labour
and collective agreement laws have come from the United States. We
imitated the United States. We took the Landrum Griffin Act and your
Wagner Act. We adopted many of the basic systems from the States
and we find ourselves today as one of only three countries in the world,
the United States and South Korea being the other two, where there is
a monopoly of representation. However, in adopting the U.S. system,
Canadians changed it in three significant areas.
First, we imposed legislation prohibiting strikes and lockouts during the term of the collective agreement. This was not an issue we
wished to leave to collective bargaining. I realize that most of your
collective agreements provide for this prohibition. However, we chose to
codify it as a matter of public policy.
Second, as a quid pro quo for this express prohibition, we imposed
mandatory arbitration. This was also an issue we would not leave to
collective bargaining. Mandatory arbitration has affected us enormously in Canada. Every grievance and dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the collective agreement must go to arbitration. There is no alternative. This particular feature of our system has
perhaps been the most influential in terms of our hiring/firing
regulation.
Lastly, of course, we have a penchant for conciliation. Hence, we
have adopted a freeze on working conditions and a wage freeze from
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the time the contract expires. However, the right to strike does not
arise until one has gone through a conciliation process. This is true in
almost all jurisdictions in Canada. In practice, we tend to go on forever
in negotiations after the collective agreement has expired. Whether this
is wise or not is something we could debate.
I am a director of the CBC. We have been negotiating a new contract for eighteen months, and even that, according to the newspapers,
is too short. The unions say it was not long enough for negotiations.
Although to me, eighteen months seems like a very significant period of
time.
At one point, I was appointed by the government as a conciliator
for the Post Office. The process went on for eighteen months after the
expiration of the last contract when we finally reached an agreement. It
was a two-year contract, eighteen months of which had already passed.
As a result, the parties began negotiating again almost as soon as we
left. There is a certain nonsense in this system of public bargaining
which does not commend itself to me. The public interest is often noticeably absent.
I ask you to note, in particular, the second feature of our system
which I mentioned earlier, that is, the importance of arbitration. The
emphasis on arbitration is evident not only in the collective bargaining
process, but also in the non-unionized sector. Particularly significant is
the degree to which our judges have, on grounds of public policy, tried
to keep employment matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of arbitrators and out of the court system.
Last year, the Supreme Court of Canada released two very important decisions in this regard. The first was the case of Weber v. Ontario
Hydro.2 Mr. Weber was employed by Ontario Hydro. As a result of
back problems, he took an extended sick leave. Hydro paid Mr. Weber
the sick leave benefits provided for under the collective agreement. After a while, however, Hydro began to suspect that Mr. Weber was malingering. Hydro hired a private investigator to look into the situation.
The investigator, under fraudulent pretence, was able to get into Mr.
Weber's home and found that he was, indeed, well and able to return
to work. Based on the information it received from the investigator,
Hydro suspended Mr. Weber for having abused his sick leave benefits.
The union filed grievances against Hydro. These grievances were
eventually settled. Parallel to this first recourse, Mr. Weber took civil
proceedings against Hydro on the basis of tort and violation of his fundamental rights under the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms. The company argued that the collective agreement provided
for final and binding arbitration of all differences between the parties
and, therefore, precluded any possible civil action between them. Mr.
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 929.
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Weber's most persuasive argument was that Charter claims raise
unique policy considerations and, thus, are best left to the inherent jurisdiction of the courts, not arbitrators.
The case came before the Supreme Court last year. In a very significant decision, the Supreme Court held that employment matters
governed by a collective agreement must be exclusively decided by arbitrators. The courts have no jurisdiction over such matters whether or
not they involve Charterarguments. Basing itself on the earlier case of
St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp & Paper Co. Ltd. v. C.P.W.U., Local 219,8
the Court decided, on grounds of public policy, that parties to a collective agreement may not institute court proceedings on any matter
which is directly or indirectly related to the collective agreement.
Let me cite Madame Justice McLachlin who, at page 954, stated
the following:
The final difficulty with the concurrent actions model is that it undercuts the purpose of the regime of exclusive arbitration, which lies at
the heart of all Canadian labour statutes. It is important that the disputes be resolved quickly and economically with a minimum of destruction to the parties and the economy. To permit concurrent court
actions whenever it can be said that the cause of action stands independent of the collective agreement undermines this goal.
On the issue of whether Charter claims, more particularly, could
be decided by arbitrators, the majority of the Court - divided four to
three on this point - said "why not?" As the aim is to designate a
single forum to regulate matters between parties to a collective agreement, arbitrators must have the power to enforce anything that arises,
directly or indirectly, from the collective agreement. Madame Justice
McLachlin, writing on behalf of the majority, reasoned as follows:
While the Charter issue may raise broad policy concerns, it is nonetheless a component of the labour dispute, and hence within the jurisdiction of the labour arbitrator. The existence of broad policy concerns with respect to a given issue cannot preclude4 the labour
arbitrator from deciding all facets of the labour dispute.
This decision went very far in stressing the importance of the arbitrator's forum. As a result of the court's reasoning, they rejected Mr.
Weber's court action. Since the union grievances had already been settled, that was the end of that.
On the same day, the Supreme Court rendered a second decision,
New Brunswick v. O'Leary,5 which further embedded arbitration in our
system. Mr. O'Leary was a senior representative of the Province of
3

[1986] 28 D.L.R. (4th) 1; [1986] 1 S.C.R. 704.

4 Supra note 2, at 960.

5 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 967.
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New Brunswick. His job required him to travel throughout the Province. One day, while driving a leased vehicle, he got a flat tire. Rather
than stopping, he decided to drive on. In so doing, he caused $2,815.56
of damage to the car. The Province of New Brunswick brought a court
action against O'Leary on grounds of negligence, claiming $2,815.56
worth of damage to the vehicle. O'Leary objected on the basis that his
employment with the Province was governed by a labour agreement.
The employer alleged that, notwithstanding, O'Leary's conduct
amounted to the tort of negligence: "You were driving a leased car and
we did not hire you to drive on the rims of your tire."
The Supreme Court of Canada applied the same reasoning as in
Weber. It held that courts should not get involved in matters arising
directly or indirectly from the collective agreement. On behalf of a
unanimous bench in this case, Madame Justice McLachlin wrote, at
page 970:
The Province's principal argument is that the collective agreement
does not expressly deal with employee negligence to employer property and its consequences. However, as noted in Weber, a dispute will
be held to arise out of the collective agreement if it falls under the
agreement either expressly or inferentially. Here the agreement does
not expressly refer to employee negligence in the course of work.
However, such negligence impliedly falls under the collective agreement. Again, it must be underscored that it is the essential character
of the difference between the parties, not the legal framework in
which the dispute is cast, which will be determinative of the appropriate forum for settlement of the issue.6
Arguably, there was an article in their collective agreement which
related to the matter at hand. Nonetheless, I do not entirely agree with
this decision because arbitrators are not, generally, asked to assess
damages against employees. I am not sure it is something most of them
would enjoy doing. Essentially, however, the Supreme Court has said
that arbitration is the preferred venue, and they do not want the courts
involved.
As a result of these decisions, one can see to what extent arbitrators have taken over from judges in employment matters. In sixty to
seventy percent of termination cases, the remedial area is arbitration
rather than the courts. Three jurisdictions, Federal, Quebec, and Nova
Scotia, make any termination dispute go to mandatory arbitration, even
in non-unionized sectors.
In other words, if I represent a bank under Federal jurisdiction
and I discharge an employee, that employee can seek reinstatement
notwithstanding that he or she is non-unionized. Compulsory arbitration will then be held in regard to that dispute. The same is true in
6

[1995] 2 S.C.R. 970.
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Quebec and Nova Scotia for anybody who is non-unionized. I have analyzed the Canadian experience of arbitration in the non-unionized sector and have found that the experiences we have had are not always
happy ones.7 On the whole, however, the public policy in large jurisdictions is such that employment matters are referred to arbitrators and
are no longer kept in the court system.
Ontario does not have such a provision, but rather, has instituted
an ADR process to which they refer employment matters, typically,
termination matters. Eighty to ninety percent of all employment claims
end up in ADR, most of which are settled. Here also, there is an attempt, even by the courts, to designate arbitration as the preferred forum for employment matters.
Lastly, there is the issue of estoppel. If an employee takes a civil
action in the courts for wrongful dismissal and, at the same time, institutes a claim for termination pay under the Employment Standards
regulations, the courts will defer to the finding under the Employment
Standards regulations. The decision of the referee (the appointed decision-maker under most Employment Standards Acts) is deemed to be
final and binding on the central question to be determined between the
parties. Hence, the issue is held to be estopped. Based on recent case
law, one begins to see how Employment Standards regulations have
eventually come to regulate the courts."
As a result, most employment matters are determined or settled
outside the court system. In certain jurisdictions, however, the courts
continue to be involved in determinations regarding proper length of
notice. As noted earlier, we do not have employment at will in Canada.
An employer may terminate employment without cause in a non-unionized setting, but only if payment is given in lieu of proper notice. In
this area, the stability of the courts has been of particular importance.
The courts have insisted on setting down a framework for determining whether the notice period given is sufficient in the circumstances. As a result, courts have established a series of considerations
to be taken into account as a guide in deciding how much advance
notice should be given. These considerations were set down originally in
a case called Bardal v. The Globe and Mail:9
There can be no catalog laid down as to what is reasonable notice in
particular classes of cases. The reasonableness of the notice must be
described with reference to each particular case having regard to the
character of the employment, the length of service of the servant, the
7 Roy L. Heenan & Thomas E.F. Brady, ArbitratingDismissals of Nonunion Employees: A
CanadianExperience, (1992) 13(3) CoMP. LAB. L.J. 273.
6 See, e.g., Rasanen v. Rosemount Instruments Ltd.,
[1994], 1 C.C.E.L. (2d) 161 (Ont.
C.A.) per Abella, J.A.; Machado v. Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc., [1995], 12 C.C.E.L. (2d) 132
(Ont. Gen. Div.).
9 [1960] O.W.N. 253, 24 D.L.R. (2d) 140 (H.C.).
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age of the servant and the availability of similar employment, having
regard to the experience, training and qualifications of the servant. 10
The court's desire to maintain stability in this area is exemplified
by the recent case of Cronk v. Canadian General Insurance Co." The
case involved a secretary whose job was terminated without just cause.
The judge in first instance acknowledged the guiding principles established in Bardal but went on, however, to disagree with them. The first
judge held that clerical employees should be awarded the same amount
of notice as more senior employees and that no distinction should be
made according to the character of employment nor the seniority of the
position. The judge then ordered a twenty-two-month advance notice
payment.
The Court of Appeal reversed this decision and reinstated the
Bardal criteria. The Court of Appeal held that the appropriate notice
period in the circumstances was twelve, rather than twenty-two
months. More important than the actual amount awarded were the underlying policy considerations therefor. The Court of Appeal stated at
page 16:
The result arrived at has a potential of disrupting the practices of a
commercial and industrial world wherein employers have to predict
with reasonable certainty the cost of downsizing or increasing their
operations, particularly in difficult economic times. As well, legal
practitioners specializing in employment law and the legal profession,
generally, have to give advice to employers and employees in respect
to termination of employment with reasonable certainty.
Essentially, what the Court of Appeal attempted to do was reimpose what they called "reasonable certainty." As a result, most employment claims in my country get settled rather than go to court. Of those
that do go to court, there are very few unexpected decisions.
There are two or three other areas of innovation which I would
like to bring to your attention, especially since they sometimes have a
way of crossing borders.
When I last spoke to you, I made considerable reference to employees' obligations of loyalty towards their employers.' 2 If you recall,
the Canadian Supreme Court imposed a fiduciary duty on senior ranking employees to remain loyal to their employer, to act in good faith, to
avoid conflict of interest, and to avoid self-interested dealings incompatible with the employment relationship.' 3 In Quebec, this duty of IoyId. at 145.
[1995] 14 C.C.E.L. (2d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), reversing (1994), 6 C.C.E.L. (2d) 15, 94 C.L.L.C.
14,032, 19 O.R. (3d) 515 (Gen. Div.).
10
11

12 Roy L. Heenan & Thomas E.F. Brady, Hiring Termination and Regulation of Employees
in the Canadian Workplace, (1990) 16 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 183.

Is Canadian Aero Services v. O'Malley, [1974] S.C.R. 562, [1973] 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371.
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alty was extended not only to directors and senior officers, but to regular employees as well. 14 Ever since these rulings by our Supreme Court,
lower courts have taken the employee's duty of loyalty and good faith
very seriously, not hesitating in the least to apply it where it is due.
Interestingly enough, courts have recently turned the other way
and now hold the employer to a duty of good faith and fair dealing visA-vis its employees. This too is an implied condition of the employment
relationship. Abusive terminations, such as, the "Friday-no-notice-getout-of-here" types of situations will cause courts to intervene on the
grounds of failure on behalf of the employer to fulfill its duty of good
faith or fair dealing.
More specifically, I draw to your attention two recent cases in
15
point. The first is the case of Trucker's Garage Inc. v. Krel. Here,
the employment contract expressly allowed either party to terminate
the agreement before the end of the contractual period on the ground
of incompatibility. The employer invoked this clause as basis for firing
Mr. Krell. After reviewing the facts of the case, the trial judge found
that the employer did not fire Mr. Krell in good faith because of incompatibility, but did so capriciously for other reasons. The Court of
Appeal agreed with the trial judge's assessment on this point and found
the employer in breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The second case of interest is the 1995 decision of Ditchburn v.
Landis & Gyr Powers Ltd."' The case involved a senior sales executive
who was earning an annual salary of $80,000. He took a customer out
one day on what can only be described as a "boozy lunch." He and the
customer later went to a local strip club. Unfortunately, after several
drinks, there ensued a physical altercation between them. The employer
immediately dismissed the employee. Most of us would not find the
employer's decision all that unreasonable under the circumstances.
However, the Ontario court did not agree. This was a fifty-nine-yearold employee with twenty-nine years of seniority who had never had
any problems in the past. The fist fight was only a momentary aberration, and the mere fact that the employee was involved in this isolated
incident was not sufficient cause for termination. The employer was
held to a duty of loyalty and good faith in dealing with the employee.
The court imposed twenty-two months of severance pay and awarded
$15,000 in mental distress. One can see here the extent to which Canadian courts might be more willing to read in public policy considerations than their American counterparts.
In this same case, the employer also gave Ditchburn a poor letter
of reference. Drawing support from past case law, 17 the court granted
14 Bank of Montreal v. Kuet Leong Ng, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 429.
1

[1993] 3 C.C.E.L. (2d) 157 (Ont. C.A.).

16 (September 29, 1995), Doc. 93-CQ-40633 (Ont. Gen. Div.), [1995] O.J. No. 2882 (Q.L.).
"

Trask v. Terra Nova Motors Ltd., [1991], 35 C.C.E.L. 208 (Nfld. T.D.); Rahentulla v.
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an additional two-month notice (hence a total of twenty-four months)
in order to compensate Ditchburn for the poor reference he received
and the related difficulty he experienced in securing a new position.
The same result has been held in wrongful dismissal cases where the
employer refuses to give former employees any reference at all.
In light of this line of jurisprudence, employers have realized how
careful they must be when drafting letters of reference for former employees. This cautious attitude has led to the Lexicon of Intentionally
Ambiguous Recommendations, 18 or "L.I.A.R.". I think I invented one
of them, which is my standard letter of reference in difficult cases.
"This is to certify that Mr. So-and-So was employed by us in such and
such a capacity from such and such a date to such and such a date. If
you can get him to work for you, you will indeed be fortunate. Yours
very truly." Is there anything wrong with that? Or, in the case of absenteeism, "She is not your average everyday employee." That seems to
me to be a perfectly good reference. Better yet, in cases of gross absenteeism, "A man like him is hard to find." Surely, no one can sue you
for that.

Vanfed Credit Union, [1984], 4 C.C.E.L. 170 (B.C.S.C.).

" Robert Thornton,

LEXICON

(Meadowbrook, New York) (1988).
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